This paper identifies share issue privatization (SIP) as a source of variation in market liquidity. SIP is shown to affect both the turnover and the price impact of 19 stock market indexes. Furthermore, the paper provides evidence of spillover effects of SIP on the price impact of private companies. This externality is related to the amount of privatized shares sold to retail investors and especially to cross-listings, as predicted by several theories of market liquidity.
Introduction
Financial market development is mentioned as one of the objectives of share issue privatization (SIP) programs in developed economies. One of the first experiments to foster the domestic stock market through privatization was carried out in Germany during the 1960s by the Adenauer government (Esser, 1994) . More recently, the promotion of investors' participation and the revitalization of national exchanges have been top priorities of privatization programs not only in the United Kingdom, but also in France, Spain, and Italy (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Dumez and Jeunemaitre, 1994; Chiri and Panetta, 1994) A remarkable wealth of evidence shows the correlation between financial market development and privatization. For instance, stock trading volume in developed countries outside the US grew from a little over $460 billion in 1983 to more than $17 trillion in 1998, while massive privatization plans were in progress (Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000) . Yet, stock markets develop also in the absence of privatization. Indeed, the US experienced an exponential growth in capitalization and turnover during the same years with only limited privatization. So does privatization contribute to the development of stock markets?
Several theories suggest that it does. Due to the positive externalities generated by listing decisions, privatization initial public offerings (IPOs) may launch an economy's stock market by improving investors' diversification opportunities (Pagano, 1989; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) . Since privatization shares are usually sold at substantial discount (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997) , SIPs also increase the participation of uninformed retail investors, and consequently reduce adverse selection in the market and improve its liquidity (Kyle, 1985) .
Finally, SIPs involving the floating of shares in both domestic and international exchanges (SIPs with cross-listings) reduce informational barriers to foreign investment, thereby boosting liquidity in the domestic market (Hargis and Ramanlal, 1998; Chiesa and Nicodano, 2003) .
Despite the relevance of these issues, a comprehensive empirical analysis concerning the impact of privatization on financial market development is still missing in the literature. This paper aims at filling this gap: it attempts to identify the transmission mechanism between privatization and stock market development.
In the paper, we consider various measures of privatization, including the number of privatized firms, the free float of privatized companies, and the capitalization of cross-listed privatized companies, and relate them to measures of financial market development. We focus on liquidity that we believe to be a fundamental aspect of stock market development. A deeper secondary market allows companies to raise capital at a lower price (Ellul and Pagano, 2004) .
Furthermore, stock liquidity -rather than stock capitalization -provides incentives for information acquisition to financial analysts, whose private signals are aggregated and partially mirrored in stock prices. This in turn stimulates the use of stock-based managerial incentive schemes, which may enhance corporate performance, economic efficiency and growth (Hölmstrom and Tirole, 1993 ). Empirically, the initial level of stock market liquidity is a robust predictor of economic growth and capital accumulation, while initial capitalization is not (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 1997) . Furthermore, the expected return on a stock is related to its liquidity level (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) , to the covariance of its liquidity with the market return (Acharya and Pedersen, 2004) and to the covariance of its return with market liquidity (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) .
In order to capture the variation in market liquidity we use the turnover ratio, i.e. the ratio of trading volume to capitalization, a proxy widely used in cross-country empirical studies of financial development (Levine, 1997) . This measure may not however account for all aspects of market liquidity. There have been episodes -such as October 1987 -when turnover was high yet market liquidity was low (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) . Moreover, several alternative indicators have proved to better capture the elusive notion of liquidity (Hasbrouk, 2003; Jones, 2002; Lesmond, 2004) . This is why we also resort to an aggregate measure of the price impact, inspired by the Amihud illiquidity index (Amihud, 2002) . Price-impact measures for the US stock market have usually been computed as averages of the price impact of individual companies (see for example Acharya and Pedersen, 2004) . In contrast to this approach, we compute the price impact of the stock index, i.e. the ratio of the absolute return on the index to total trading volume, and show that for the US, our proxy moves closely together with the average of the individual price impact measures. Albeit new relative to previous research, these results could be ascribed to the higher liquidity of privatized stocks themselves. Contrasting this view, we emphasize the existence of a positive externality associated with privatization: the liquidity of private companies is shown to be positively related to the extent of SIP. This spillover effect lies at the core of several theories of financial market development. In particular, the sale of shares to retail investors is shown to be strongly correlated with aggregate liquidity, suggesting that increased uninformed trading may reduce adverse selection and hence bid-ask spreads. Another aspect of SIP that explains aggregate liquidity is the cross-listing of privatized stocks, whose effects may be linked to improved risk-sharing among investors exposed to different country risk, as well as reduced informational barriers and improved corporate governance standards.
Our empirical study complements existing evidence on stock market liberalization and development, which mainly refers to developing and emerging economies. In that context, privatization is usually linked to a country's decision to liberalize the stock market by allowing for foreigners' stock purchases. A burgeoning empirical literature has shown the effects of such liberalization on equity prices, on the cost of capital, investment, and systemic liquidity (Henry, 2000; Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Jain-Chandra, 2002) . The OECD countries considered in this study did not have formal barriers to foreign investment during the sample period. This allows us to isolate more accurately the effect of privatization on liquidity, while controlling for the degree of economic openness and for the intense financial integration, which took place, especially among the European countries, during the 1990s.
Our research is also related to the vast literature assessing the economic effects of privatization. Several papers document substantial improvements in the economic and financial performance of privatized firms, and point out the sources of these improvements (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Bortolotti et al., 2002) . However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous research has analyzed the spillover effect of privatization on liquidity and turnover in developed economies.
In the next section, we provide a conceptual framework to analyze how privatization may affect stock market development and, in particular, liquidity. The review of theoretical models allows us to set forth some empirical implications and to identify the potentially relevant privatization measures to be used in the econometric analysis. Section 3 and 4 present the data set and the empirical model we use. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.
Privatization and market liquidity: a theoretical framework.
A stock is illiquid when "sell" orders are filled at a lower price than "buy" orders. Such price premium can be interpreted as the compensation required by traders and intermediaries who satisfy other investors' liquidity needs. The price premium has three main components (see O'Hara, 1995) . The first is the risk premium. It arises due to the fact that liquidity provision implies a temporary deviation from optimal asset holdings, involving excess risk taking. The second component is linked to adverse selection: the order being filled may be placed by a counterpart with private information on the future price. The third component is simply given by material trading costs. In what follows, we identify the channels through which SIP affects these components of the price premium.
First, SIP may reduce the risk premium by improving investors' diversification opportunities when, due to a coordination failure among firms and investors, stock markets are trapped in a low liquidity-high risk premium equilibrium (Pagano,1993) . Investors have opportunities to diversify their portfolios only if many firms go public. However, the equilibrium number of private IPOs may be lower than optimal. This is because each entrepreneur bears the full listing cost, but does not internalize the diversification benefits arising from an additional listing. If investors anticipate too few IPOs, they do not enter the equity market, which results in a small and illiquid stock market. A privatization policy, aiming at increasing the number of IPOs of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), can move away the equilibrium from this under-development trap benefiting the liquidity of private companies.
Indeed, the government -being the single owner of several listed firms -can better "internalize" the benefits from additional listings.
A similar effect on stock market liquidity arises when agents receive on-the-job costless information concerning their own companies' payoffs, as in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) . Since it may not be possible for investors to trade shares of private firms, opportunities to profit from such "serendipitous" information exist only if firms go public. In turn, going public firms may benefit from a large number of informed investors who require a lower risk premium because their information enables them to forecast firms' payoffs more accurately. This increases liquidity. Again, a coordination failure may lead to a low-welfarelow-liquidity equilibrium in which agents correctly anticipate too few IPOs and firms do not consequently list their shares. An established SIP program may induce both informed investors and firms to enter the stock market.
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These theories suggest that stock market liquidity is positively related to the number of privatization IPOs.
H1: Privatization IPOs increase the liquidity of stock markets caught in a low-liquidity trap.
Second, SIPs could also affect the adverse selection component of the price premium.
Privatization IPOs may reduce the likelihood of information trading, through increasing the participation of retail investors, who typically have smaller holdings than financial institutions and hence less incentives to acquire costly information. The lower is the likelihood of dealing with a sophisticated counterpart, the smaller are anticipated losses, and the lower is the bid-ask spread, i.e. the premium that speculators and dealers charge to liquidity traders (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985) . Several privatization programs were designed to attract a large number of small investors by choosing the fixed-price offering method combined with the underpricing of shares (Benveniste and Busaba, 1997; Jones et al., 1999) . Due to these attempts, privatization turned out to be an important method of reducing ownership concentration in many large companies: almost two-thirds of the 54 non-US firms with over 500.000 shareholders are privatized firms (Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000) .
These arguments yield the following empirical implication:
H2: SIP programs increase stock market liquidity by fostering the participation of retail investors.
Third, SIPs may reduce the risk premium by stimulating the participation of foreign investors. Privatization has typically been associated with the cross-listing of shares such that the shares of a large state-owned enterprise are issued both on the local and on at least one foreign exchange. Road-shows performed in connection with the listing in the international exchange may be particularly good means to increase foreign participation in the domestic market. These shows are typically aimed at providing investors information not only about the firm on sale but also about the country of its incorporation. 2 They usually bring along enhanced investor recognition, which leads to greater investments and reduced risk premium (Merton, 1987; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) .
Even though it concerns primarily the cross-listed firms, foreign participation will also benefit the liquidity of shares traded only in the local market. If the returns of privatized and local companies are positively correlated, foreigners will share some of the risk borne only by domestic investors prior to privatization. This reduces the required risk premium and thereby increases the value of domestic shares (Chiesa and Nicodano, 2003) .
H3: A SIP program implemented through cross-listings increases stock market liquidity by enhancing the participation of foreign investors.
Considering order flow migration to foreign markets yields a competing empirical implication with respect to H3. By definition, order flow migration decreases the domestic turnover of cross-listed stocks. At the same time, enhanced competition among market makers located in different exchanges may reduce bid-ask spreads. The net effect on domestic liquidity depends on transparency, i.e. inter-market information linkages (Domowitz et al, 1998) . The more markets are informationally related, the lower are the liquidity costs of order-flow migration. Under (full) transparency domestic liquidity and the turnover of cross-listed stocks are both unambiguously high because the beneficial effect of increased competition dominates. Hargis and Ramanlal (1998) also analyze companies listed only domestically. 3 Crosslistings have a negative effect on both liquidity and turnover of purely domestic stocks even when the domestic liquidity of cross-listed stocks improves thanks to transparency, as in 2 "Governments have discovered that privatization through a global equity market placement created an unmatched opportunity to get the attention of investors around the world and to tell the country's story. No investment mission has the impact of a global equity road-show." Jeffrey R. Shafer, Salomon Smith Barney, in Privatisation International Yearbook, 2000. 3 Several papers investigate the incentive for a company to list abroad (see Pagano et al., 2002 and references therein) . A key finding is that companies that cross-list their shares in US markets have higher growth opportunities than those that issue shares in countries other than the US or remain domestic. Moreover, companies cross-listed in the US are valued more when they issue shares via public offerings, rather than via private placements (Doidge et al, 2004) . Compared to these papers, our focus is different: we investigate the effects of cross-listings on the liquidity of the domestic market. Domowitz et al. (1998) 
Data
We are interested in isolating the effect of SIP in developed economies with established stock markets, so we focus on a group of OECD countries. We exclude from the sample Luxembourg, Iceland and Ireland since their stock markets were not systematically covered by conventional data sources over the entire period. Turkey and Greece are also ignored because of foreign ownership restrictions in some of the sample years.
As a result, the analysis covers 19 economies in a panel with monthly observations over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . For a few countries stock market data turned out to be available only from a date later than January 1985. Table 2 shows the first day of the period considered for each country included in the sample.
Privatization and financial market development: descriptive analysis
Our main source for privatization information is Privatisation International, which has been part of IFR-Platinum Database of Thomson Financial since 1998. 4 It reports qualitative and quantitative information about all privatization transactions (public offers, asset sales, and concessions), worth more than US$500,000, in the world over the 1977-2000 period.
The low cut-off transaction value allows us to include virtually the whole population of SIPs implemented over the sample period.
We define a SIP as an issue of common stock of a state-owned enterprise on a public equity market. This definition includes both IPOs and secondary offerings. We collect information concerning the date of issue, company industry, the target market (domestic and international), and the percentage of capital sold at the privatization sale. We then follow the history of the company during the sample period in order to track the changes of names, the de- 
Measuring privatization on public equity markets
We collect information on daily stock prices, market capitalization, and the value of trades for each privatized company (all expressed in local currency) and for the market as a whole from Datastream. We then construct monthly series at the country level of several privatization variables. In the empirical analysis, we employ several privatization measures in order to disentangle the different transmission channels identified by the theory.
To test H1 we need to focus on the number of privatization IPOs. In this direction, we take the cumulative number of privatized firms scaled by the total number of listed firms (per month and per country), as reported in WFE (World Federation of Exchanges) publications.
We will further refer to this ratio as PRIVANUM. This measure is suitable for an empirical test of the analyses in Pagano (1989 Pagano ( ,1993 and in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) . In those models the number of firms listed in a market serves as a proxy for investors' diversification opportunities. IPOs spur liquidity when markets are caught in a low-liquidity trap. To capture the possible non-linear effect of privatization IPOs on market liquidity, we refine our measure by interacting PRIVANUM with a dummy taking the value 1 if the number of listed firms in a given country in the initial year was below 336 -the median value of the number of firms listed across countries -and zero otherwise. The resulting variable is PRIVATRAP.
A test of H2 requires a proxy for the involvement of retail investors in SIPs. The variable PRIVAFLOAT is defined as the product of market capitalization of the privatized company and the cumulative percentage of capital floated in the domestic market (taking into account seasoned equity issues), scaled by total market capitalization. This variable measures the free float of privatized companies, which is a suitable proxy for uninformed liquidity trading as in Kyle (1985) . The previously defined variables, PRIVANUM and PRIVATRAP, account for the changes in privatization resulting from IPOs only. In contrast, PRIVAFLOAT also allows us to capture the variation in privatization due to secondary offerings. Table 1 reports the (end of period) value of PRIVAFLOAT for each country. The float of French privatized companies represents more than half of the capitalization (59 percent) of the entire market. In this respect, France is followed by Spain and Portugal, where the free float amounted to roughly 30 percent of total market capitalization.
Our database reports accurate information about the international profile of SIPs including the target markets where privatization shares were issued. This information allows us to distinguish between companies floated only domestically (PRIVADOM), and companies listed also in one or more foreign exchanges (PRIVABROAD). This distinction is crucial for a proper test of H3 and H4. PRIVADOM is the sum of the capitalization of privatized companies listed only in the domestic market, while PRIVABROAD is equal to the sum of the capitalization of privatized companies listed both in the domestic and in one or more foreign exchanges. Both variables are scaled by total market capitalization. Using the variable PRIVABROAD, we are able to test the specific effect of increased foreign market participation on domestic liquidity.
International exchanges vary greatly in terms of listings requirements, transparency and legal protection of minority investors. In order to test whether the exposure of privatized companies to higher standards of corporate governance has a positive effect on the liquidity of their shares (H5), we isolate the companies listed at NYSE both directly and indirectly through a level III American Depositary Receipt (ADR) (see Karolyi, 1998 
Measuring market liquidity
We obtain stock market data from Datastream. For a given country, the (daily) turnover for day d in month t is equal to the total value of shares traded (TVOLUME) scaled by total daily market capitalization (MVALUE):
Monthly turnover is constructed by dividing the total trading volume over a month by the average market value during that month.
The turnover ratio is a standard indicator of market development in the macro-finance literature. However, stock market models highlighted in the theoretical section bear implications for a more conventional notion of stock illiquidity, the price impact, 7 rather than the volume of trading activity. Its computation however requires transaction data, which are hard to find for long time spans. Moreover, market microstructure varies across countries, making transaction data hardly comparable. These difficulties can be circumvented by using the ratio of absolute return to dollar volume (Amihud, 2002) , a proxy for the price impact, which has recently been shown to both capture the illiquidity of stock portfolios (Hasbrouk, 2003) and be correlated with individual expected returns (Acharya and Pedersen, 2004) .
In order to compute market liquidity we use the aggregate counterpart of the Amihud illiquidity measure, namely the ratio of the absolute return on the index to total volume. 8 The standard practice in the literature for illiquidity in month t is the average of this ratio for all days within that month:
where |R dt | is the absolute daily return, and D is the number of trading days in month t. In order to mitigate the impact of outliers, we use the monthly median of the absolute return-to-turnover ratio instead of the monthly average. Given that we use turnover at the denominator, a value of 3 of ILLIQ indicates that the absolute return is 3% on a day when 1% of the market value is traded. This measure indicates that the market is illiquid -that is, has a high value of ILLIQ tif the index moves a lot in response to little turnover. 7 The price impact coincides with the price response associated with a unit trade in auction markets (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985) and with the effective bid-ask spread in dealer markets (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Biais, 1993; Dennert, 1993) . 8 The market index may not include all the companies in a market. Usually, the most important companies are selected on the basis of their market value. The approximate number of stocks ranges from 50 (Austria, Greece, Portugal, Denmark and Finland) to 1000 (US, Japan).
Our price impact measures are based on aggregate market return and turnover, and therefore differ from the average of the Amihud index on individual stocks, which has been computed for the US market by Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2004) . To compare this market-based measure with individual firm based estimates, we calculate ILLIQ for all the SP500 firms, and take an average of these measures. We refer to the resulting series as the ' 'individual ILLIQ measure'. We also calculate an 'aggregate ILLIQ measure' based on the SP500 return and the aggregate turnover on the SP500 stocks. The sample we have available for this exercise runs from January 1990 through November 2000. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variable. In early years of the sample period, until 1994 approximately, the ILLIQ measures in certain countries are unusually high. In later years the ILLIQ measure is more stable in time and more similar across countries, although countries with higher capitalization to GDP ratio (Germany, Netherlands, UK and USA) seem to have higher liquidity. In all markets, the ILLIQ measure is declining over time, indicating an improvement in liquidity, accompanied by a remarkable increase in turnover. 9 The difference between the series is caused by the different composition of the SP500 and Datastream indices.
Empirical model
We investigate the average impact of SIP on market liquidity by estimating the following specification:
where it y is the dependent variable that is the price impact (ILLIQ) or (the log of) the monthly turnover ratio for country i in month t, 10 PRIVA it is a privatization measure, x it is a vector of control variables, α i is a country fixed effect, and α t is a year fixed effect. We consider the following control variables suggested by the literature on privatization and stock market development.
Market size. We use the (log of the) total number of listed firms to control for market size. The number of listed firms is a proxy for diversification opportunities which affect liquidity in Pagano (1989) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) . Other control variables, like market capitalization, may not fully capture these diversification effects as a large market could arise due to the participation of a few large firms. Including the number of firms as an explanatory variable may cause simultaneity problems in the regressions because market size may be endogenous to liquidity. To avoid this problem, for an observation at month t we take into account the number of listed firms at month (t-12). This provides only a partial solution to the problem making the lagged variable predetermined but not strictly exogenous. However, since the longitudinal size of our panel is relatively large (16 years of monthly data), we believe the resulting bias is of second-order relevance (see Baltagi, 1995) .
Country risk. In emerging economies country risk is often of a primary concern. It is an a priori less serious concern in advanced economies with established democracies and a sound rule of law. In spite of this expectation, we employ a number of control variables in all the regressions, to capture changes in the institutional environment and the countries' policy risk assessments. Capital market integration. We include a dummy EU92 that is equal to one for 1992 and later years for the European Union countries. This dummy is expected to capture the effect of European capital market integration that picked up substantially after the conclusion of the Maastricht treaty. Due to increased competition in the financial services industry, in the last decade EU countries began to modernize their financial institutions and regulatory practices. In several countries, the trading system in the stock exchange has been drastically reformed, 11 a development that is likely to affect liquidity. This phenomenon is at the core of the theoretical analysis in Biais (1993) , where competition among stock exchange intermediaries improves liquidity. As the number of dealers increases, the premium charged to liquidity traders falls because dealers attempt to undercut each other's prices. We also construct a dummy variable for 1996 and subsequent years, to capture the possible acceleration in European stock market integration triggered by the implementation of the first Investment Services Directive. Under the new rules, financial intermediaries in a certain member country could directly conclude transactions in another member country, without opening a local brokerage branch.
We also control for the impact of financial liberalization through a measure of openness to trade, given by the sum of export and imports relative to GDP of the particular country. The correlation between trade and capital flows induced by liberalization has been widely documented in the literature (see Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2001 ).
Last but not least, the official launch of the Euro may have reduced the currency premium, thus increasing the liquidity of EMU stock markets. Even if the currency risk of the original constituent currencies were priced properly, as argued by Dumas and Solnik (1995) and Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) , the elimination of such risks in 1999 through a single 11 For a good overview of these developments see Demarchi and Foucault (1998). currency may have reduced the risk premium component of the price impact. We thus include a dummy variable (EURO) which equals 1 from 1999 on, in order to test whether there is an independent effect associated with the introduction of a single European currency.
Insider trading. Illiquidity increases with the likelihood of information trading (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985) initiated both by analysts and insiders. Enforcement of insider trading regulation may reduce the adverse selection premium and thus increase liquidity provided that the information produced by analysts is not a substitute of the insiders'
foreknowledge. This hypothesis is supported by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) , showing that turnover significantly increases after the first prosecution for insider trading in a large panel of countries. We use the indicator for the enforcement of insider trading regulations in
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) as a control variable (INSIDER). The dummy takes the value
one starting from the year of the first prosecution for insider trading.
Endogeneity
Consistent estimates for equation (1) can be obtained under the assumption that the explanatory variables PRIVA it and x it are uncorrelated with the error terms, υ it . The condition implies that E[PRIVA it υ it ]=0. In our basic model however this condition may not hold: the privatization variables are likely to be endogenous. Governments may attempt to privatize at times when stock prices are high. To the extent that "hot markets" are accompanied with high trading intensity, privatization may be simultaneously determined with liquidity. In this case, consistent estimates are obtained through two stage least squares estimation (2SLS). To perform the analysis, we use a vector of exogenous instruments it z for which the condition
The empirical literature has identified a set of valid instruments that suit our endogeneity problem. These variables are strongly correlated with SIP but are uncorrelated with market liquidity Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003) . They include the partisan orientation of governments, political-institutional indexes, and public finance variables. The proxy for political orientation ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right of the political spectrum). It is given by the weighted average of scores attributed in expert surveys to the parties supporting the government, as in Huber and Inglehart (1995) . The weights are the number of seats obtained by each party as a percentage of the total number of seats of the ruling coalition. The political-institutional index has been developed in comparative political science and it positions countries in the majoritarian/consensual dimensions of the political spectrum (see Lijphart 1999) .
12 These political indexes are based on electoral data and display variability both in time and longitudinal dimension. The public finance variables include the fiscal deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio.
To follow the conventional 2SLS routine, we run 19 regressions (one for each country) of the endogenous privatization variables on all the instruments z it and exogenous variables x it , including an intercept and year dummies; the year dummies control for variations that are common across countries, such as business cycles, stock market bubbles, and the reduction in trading costs due to technological developments. 
Finally, we adjust the standard errors of regression (2) to the two-step nature of the estimation procedure (Baltagi, 2001) . Standard errors are computed by the Newey-West procedure for panel data that takes into account heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 13 In reporting the results, we use the 1% significance level, unless otherwise indicated.
Stationarity
A potential problem in the empirical work is the non-stationarity of the data. To test for stationarity of the dependent variables and the primary explanatory variables in the regression model, we employed a panel unit root test developed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) . We 12 It is an average of three (standardized) variables measuring the dis-proportionality of the electoral rule, the effective number of parties, and government stability. For a more accurate description of the variables and sources see Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) . 13 Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West procedure with a window of 13 months. For an exact description of the procedure in a fixed effects panel data model, we refer to Greene (2000, p.580) .
found that we can reject non-stationarity for all our dependent variables, i.e. the liquidity measures, and also for volatility. 14 Some of the explanatory variables like market capitalization and the variables measuring privatization are, however, non-stationary. The non-stationarity of the privatization variables is not surprising at all since privatization exhibits an upward trend during the sample period. In spite of this, in the regressions we did not encounter problems of non-stationarity of the residuals.
Empirical results
In this section, we describe our results. After presenting evidence on SIP as a determinant of aggregate market liquidity, we test for the existence of a spillover effect of privatization on the liquidity of private companies, as well. privatization and liquidity in stand-alone specifications. In both Panels, each of the first six regressions includes one privatization indicator in isolation together with a number of control variables. In order to gain insights concerning the most important transmission channels, we estimate the combined effects of significant privatization variables (see regressions (7)- (10) in Panel A and in regression (7) in Panel B).
Privatization and aggregate market liquidity
The PRIVA variables estimate the direct incremental effect of privatization on market liquidity above the indirect effect of the increase in the number of listed firms, which is captured by the variable NUMFIRMS. Our most important finding is that SIPs have a statistically significant direct impact on market liquidity besides the indirect effect associated with an increase in the number of listed firms. In particular, the coefficients of PRIVAFLOAT, PRIVABROAD, and PRIVANYSE are statistically significant in the estimations of ILLIQ.
14 The results of these non-stationarity tests are available on request from the authors.
SIPs associated with cross-listings display the strongest effect: PRIVABROAD and PRIVANYSE remain highly significant also in the turnover regressions.
The negative ( Overall, the results in Table 3 do not reject H2, H3, and H5. In order to identify the dominating transmission channel between SIP and liquidity, we first compare t-statistics, goodness-of-fit measures, and the effects of changes in the standard deviation of the privatization variables on liquidity. These criteria suggest that the effect of cross-listings dominates the effect arising from increased participation of retail investors. We then consider combinations of the statistically significant privatization indicators in regressions (7), (8), (9) in Panel A and in regression (7) years to a low of around 2 in the last years, one can draw the conclusion that the effect of an increase in SIP is economically very significant. The effect of privatization on turnover is also remarkable: a one standard deviation shock in PRIVABROAD and PRIVANYSE raises log(TURNOVER) by 15% and 23%, respectively.
Several control variables turn out to have significant impact on liquidity. The size of the equity market is an important determinant of both the ILLIQ and turnover indices (with reverse signs) when measured by the (log of the lagged) number of listed companies (NUMFIRMS). Regressions using proxies for total market capitalization give similar results.
The coefficient of NUMFIRMS measures the average improvement in liquidity due to the increase in the number of listings in domestic markets. Thus, it shows the indirect impact that past privatizations have on liquidity via raising the number of listed companies.
The dummy variable for capital market integration in EU countries (EU92) and the measure of openness of the countries (TRADE) are also significantly correlated with ILLIQ and turnover suggesting that enhanced competition among financial intermediaries leads to improvements in liquidity and trading intensity. These findings are in line with Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) who argue that financial liberalization leads to a lower cost of capital and may thus improve liquidity. Other measures of liberalization, such as dummy 16 Other combinations do not carry further information and are therefore not reported.
variables associated with the introduction of either the EURO (in 1999) or the First Investment Services Directive (in 1996), have no explanatory power and are not reported.
The effect of privatization on liquidity is robust to including the ICRG political risk measure in the estimation. Political risk seems to have no impact on ILLIQ. At the same time, it turns out to have a significant negative effect on turnover. Higher political risk (i.e. a lower value of the ICRG indicator) is associated with higher trading intensity, a puzzling result we leave unexplained.
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Among the other institutional variables mentioned in Section 4, only the enforcement of insider trading rules (INSIDER) has a coefficient that significantly differs from zero. This suggests that, in line with the results in Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) , the enforcement of insider trading rules fosters stock market development. Other control variables -such as indicators of expropriation and repudiation risk, the quality of the bureaucracy, the rule of law, corruption, and ethnic tensions -neither affect liquidity, nor change the significance of the impact of privatization. Due to space constraints, we do not include these results in our tables.
The spillover effect of SIP programs
So far, we focused on aggregate liquidity, i.e. the liquidity of the market as a whole.
One may argue, however, that the increase in liquidity due to privatization is simply a direct consequence of the higher liquidity of the privatized firms' shares. This may indeed be the case since large privatized firms represent attractive investment opportunities for financial institutions. But does privatization contribute to the liquidity of non-privatized firms? In other words, does a significant spillover effect of privatization on the liquidity of private companies exist -as implied by several of the theories we referred to in section 2?
We measure the liquidity of non-privatized companies using the following method. We obtain daily market value (trading volume) of non-privatized firms by subtracting the market value (trading volume) of the privatized firms from the total market value (total trading volume). This procedure is slightly inaccurate, because in our data set total market value and turnover refer to the constituents of the Datastream index, which does not always include all companies listed in the domestic market. On the other hand, privatized firms -often the largest 17 There may be an indirect effect of privatization on liquidity via an associated reduction in political risk, as in Perotti and Laeven (2002) . Thus, we compute a measure of political risk orthogonal to privatization, which is given by the residuals of a regression of POLRISK on two privatization variables (PRIVANUM and PRIVAFLOAT). When we include this measure as an explanatory variable, we obtain very similar results.
ones with the most actively traded shares -are typically included in the index. 18 Our approach will thus 'correct too much' the total market value and may result in an underestimated value of non-privatized firms. This bias will however distort our empirical results against the hypothesis of a positive spillover effect. Taken these arguments into account, we believe that our data set is suitable for the empirical inquiry on the effect of privatization on the liquidity of nonprivatized firms.
Using the newly created data, we construct daily return 19 and turnover series, and calculate the average ILLIQ and turnover measures using the definitions described in Section 3.
The resulting variables NONPRIV_ILLIQ and NONPRIV_TURNOVER refer to the illiquidity and turnover of non-privatized firms. In Table 4 , we present estimations, based on the same explanatory variables as regressions in Table 3 The results in Table 4 show that privatization does generate cross-asset externalities. Results in Panel B show that the turnover of non-privatized companies is stimulated by both the country's openness to trade (TRADE) and the enforcement of insider trading rules 18 We have checked the coverage of privatized companies in the Datastream Index for a random sample of countries using the Data Appendix. On average, 98% of privatized companies are included in the market index. 19 Daily return is set equal to the relative change in market value of the non-privatized firms. This excludes dividends, and includes increases in market cap due to new issues of non privatized firms. Unfortunately, we don't have a proper price index of non-privatized firms only.
(INSIDER), while it is unaffected by the cross-listings of privatization stocks. 20 If we take into account the evidence in Table 3 concerning the positive effect on overall turnover, we can conclude that trading by active foreign investors is concentrated in cross-listed privatized companies. This finding can be reconciled with H3: even if foreign investors trade only crosslisted securities, a positive liquidity spillover will arise because of improved risk sharing.
Indeed foreigners bear some of the domestic risk that -prior to cross-listing-was borne by domestic investors.
The spillover effect of privatization on liquidity is large. A one standard deviation change in the variables PRIVAFLOAT, PRIVABROAD, and PRIVANYSE results in a decrease in the NONPRIV_ILLIQ measure of 1.12, 1.36 and 1.07, respectively. These effects are only slightly smaller than for the market as a whole, indicating that the change in private firms' liquidity due to SIP is of the same order of magnitude as the change in liquidity of the privatized firms. Looking at stand-alone specifications (regressions (1)- (6) Regressions (7)- (13) reflect however that the explanatory power of the estimate fades away when the variable is considered together with other privatization measures. Equation (3) indicates that SIP targeted to retail investors (PRIVAFLOAT) is also positively correlated with the liquidity of private companies in a stand-alone specification. When other privatization measures are included in the estimation, however, PRIVAFLOAT also looses its explanatory power.
PRIVABROAD is thus the only measure that survives all robustness checks, its coefficient remaining both statistically and quantitatively significant in all regressions.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to understanding the sources of monthly variation in liquidity at the market level by studying turnover and price impact of 19 stock market indexes. It indicates that liquidity is enhanced by share issue privatization, as often claimed by policymakers. These results survive after including several controls for other observable and unobservable factors, having also considered the endogenous nature of the decision to privatize.
Privatization-related reductions in the aggregate price impact are not simply driven by the liquidity of privatized stocks themselves, but also by the cross-asset externality generated by SIP. In other words privatization has a spillover effect on the price impact of other nonprivatized stocks, besides the perhaps obvious impact on the liquidity of privatized companies'
shares.
This externality is primarily linked to the cross-listing of privatization shares in international markets, which reduces the price impact of non-privatized stocks without however affecting their turnover. We suggest to interpret this finding with theories of liquidity emphasizing the role of risk sharing. Through privatization, governments allow for the trading of company related risk which was not tradable before. Through cross-listings, governments enhance foreign investors' recognition and participation in domestic assets. Increased participation and trading of international investors in privatized stocks increases aggregate turnover, without affecting the turnover of non-privatized securities. It also lowers the overall risk borne by domestic investors, thus reducing their required risk premium thereby increasing the liquidity of non-privatized securities.
Retail investors' participation in privatization also turns out to explain monthly variation in market liquidity, possibly because retail investors increase uninformed trading, thereby reducing the adverse selection component of the price impact. The effect of cross listings however seems to be both quantitatively and statistically more significant. PRIVANUM is the ratio of the number of privatized firms to the total number of listed firms. PRIVATRAP is PRIVANUM interacted with a dummy taking the value one if the country reported in 1985 was lower than the median value, and zero otherwise. PRIVAFLOAT is the value of the free float of privatized firms scaled by total market capitalization. PRIVADOM is the sum of the capitalization of privatized companies listed only in the home market, scaled by total market capitalization. PRIVABROAD is the sum of the capitalization of privatized companies listed at home and in one or more than one foreign exchange, scaled by total market capitalization. PRIVANYSE is the sum of the capitalization of privatized companies listed at home and fully listed at New York Stock Exchange (ADR level III are also considered). NUMFIRMS is the (log) of the total number of listed companies, lagged one year. TRADE is the sum of export and imports, scaled by GDP. EU92 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 from 1-1-1992 onwards, and zero otherwise, for EU countries. POLRISK is the International Country Risk Guide political risk measure. INSIDER is a dummy taking the value one starting from the date of one country's first prosecution of insider trading. Instrumental variables are the debt ratio, the deficit to GDP, the political orientation of privatizing government (PARTISAN), and a political-institutional index locating countries in the majoritarian-consensual dimension, POLINST. Year dummies are always included in the regressions without reporting estimated coefficients. Significant estimates are typed bold, t-statistics are in brackets. 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
